Reîntoarcerea unor elemente caracteristice ale comunismului sub forma suprareglementărilor UE:
Communism’s Comeback?
Václav Klaus (în stânga), 1992 |
We considered economic and political reforms to be interconnected and indivisible. To separate them à la China was, in Central and Eastern Europe, impossible. The unrealistic concept of gradualism was (and is) based on the belief in the possibility of a detailed programme of reform. It would have been, however, possible only in the absence of political freedom, which was not our case.
We knew that the transformation project had to be ours, based on our ideas and realities. We did not consider ourselves representatives of international institutions and we did not feel any reason to please them. We tried to find our own "Czech way" and to give the people a chance to be part of the game, not just passive observers.
The decisive part of the transformation process was massive, wholesale privatisation. In our case, it was based on several ideas:
- Our goal was to privatise practically all the existing state-owned firms, not just to allow the setting up of new firms on "green fields".
- Swift privatisation was considered to be the best contribution to the much-needed restructuring of inefficient state-owned firms (we did not believe in the ability of the government to restructure the firms prior to privatisation).
- Privatisation of firms in the real economy couldn't wait for the completion of bank privatisation (it had to go in parallel).
- Because of the lack of domestic capital (which did not exist in the Communist era) and because of the very limited number of serious potential foreign investors, firms had to be privatised at a low price. This idea led us to the concept of "voucher privatisation", which played an important, but not dominant, role in our country which is often misunderstood. Less than a quarter of the Czech privatisation programme was carried out by means of vouchers.
From the very beginning, we knew we had to privatise the economy we inherited as quickly as possible. We did not want to leave our shortly-to-be-privatised-firms in a pre-privatisation limbo in which they would rapidly lose their value. For that reason, we did not have any great interest in the maximisation of the proceeds of privatisation. The speed of privatisation was seen as an asset, not a liability.
At the same time, we liberalised, deregulated and desubsidised the economy radically and quickly. This liberalising tendency lasted, to our great regret, for only part of the last 25 years. Partly because of the slowing of our own reform momentum (for domestic political reasons), but mostly because of our applying to and finally entering the EU, we started a reverse process. That is why our economy is more regulated and subsidised (and harmonised and standardised) now than 10-15 years ago. The final blow came with the recent financial and economic crisis, and with the methods of its "treatment" by means of very extensive government intervention.
Our economy is now more regulated and subsidised than we imagined at the time of the collapse of the fall of Communism. We did not believe it could ever happen. It seemed to us that the masterminding of the economy from above was so discredited by the Communist experience that it could never return. We were wrong.
We also assumed that everyone understood that government failure is inevitably much bigger than any imaginable market failure, that the visible hand of the state is always much more dangerous than the invisible hand, and that vertical relations in society must be less productive (and less democratic) than horizontal relations. Again, we were wrong.
Twenty-five years ago, I warned against creating a negative expectations-reality gap because it would have undermined our reform process. I have to accept that I myself feel such a huge expectation-reality gap now. I expected to live in a much more free and democratic society and economy than is the case today.
It was caused partly by the victory of social democracy in our country and partly by the importing of the European economic system, with its overregulation, high taxation and redistribution, welfare state, and fascination with all kinds of anti-market measures, connected nowadays mostly with environmentalism, with its anti-democratic social ideology which successfully hides its real substance while pretending to care about nature, the environment and our Blue Planet. We may be oversensitive in this respect because of our long Communist experience but we see many similar phenomena, tendencies, ambitions and arguments around us today.
To allow this to happen means that we have learned nothing from history, and especially from the Communist era. It means that celebrating the end of Communism is inappropriate. It is creeping back in different forms, under different flags and slogans, without sufficient resistance from us.
Standpoint magazine, published December 14, 2014.
This is an edited text of a speech of Václav Klaus to mark "25 Years after the Berlin Wall" at an IEA/ASI event in London on November 10, 2014.
http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/3671
10 comentarii :
- Mi-ar fi plăcut dacă s-ar fi referit explicit la importanţa pentru un stat a existenţei capitalului (mai ales industrial-bancar) autohton, nu doar "de adopţie".
- Are unele deformaţii de tip lozincard ("să privatizăm tot-tot-tot !") pe care ar fi trebuit să şi le corecteze, în urma experienţei celor 25 de ani care au trecut.
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Mai este ceva care nu se discută aproape DELOC şi anume faptul că
proprietatea ,inclusiv cea individuală trebuie protejată de hoţi , de
către statul de drept.
Este inadmisibil să furnizezi Poliţiei video-uri luate de camera de supraveghere privind două furturi şi să-ţi vină răspuns că autorii erau minori, când pe cameră se vede că sunt adulţi..
Nu s-a făcut nimic în sensul ăsta.
Ce sa mai spunem despre proprietatea comună... a STATULUI.. Asta s-a furat cu acte în regulă -
Ca şi dreptul de deţinere şi de folosire a armelor de foc letale în scop de autoapărare.
Toate chestiunile astea trebuie repetate mereu, şi mereu, şi mereu... -
În America proprietatea se păzeşte cu arma în mână , cu străjnicie atât
de către indivizi cât şi de către Poliţia care reprezintă STATUL.
Dacă nu se face aşa rezultatul este statul de tip MAFIOT pe care-l avem noi acum .
Nu ştiu dacă peste tot există legea ca sistemul de supraveghere cu camere trebuie să fie raportat la poliţie . Nu prea-mi vine să cred.. pentru ca este un foarte bun prilej ca să te trezeşti cu hoţi trimişi de personaje care au acces la camerele montate de tine . Se numesc "guest" şi au setarea în soft.. Mai sunt si hackerii care intră.
Nu poţi avea capitalism fără stat de drept cu reglementări care să apere în mod real proprietatea. -
Despre realizari naţionale, firme autohtone nimeni nu pomeneşte NIMIC ,
de parca n-ar exista . Este pur şi simplu o modă să ridici în slăvi
firmele străine.
http://adevarul.ro/locale/craiova/foto-reprezentantii-companiei-construit-trenul-electric-sf-ar-trebui-mutam-domiciliul-romania-uite-noi-1_547ff77fa0eb96501e595a35/index.html - Dreptul american are aşa-numita "doctrină a castelului" (The Castle Doctrine sau "stay your ground"): un cetăţean poate respinge cu mijloace letale un atac efectuat asupra sa sau a membrilor familiei/comunităţii de către intruşi agresivi. Am accenntuat "atac" - nu intră aici (de exemplu) împuşcarea în spate a unui hoţ care fuge, văzând că i se opune rezistenţă.
- Locuinţa este "castelul" cetăţeanului, pe care are dreptul să-l apere, apărându-şi şi viaţa sa.
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Pâi nici nu prea mai avem firme autohtone în marea industrie...
Nu-mi dau seama când ne vom reveni. -
"atac" - nu intră aici (de exemplu) împuşcarea în spate a unui hoţ care fuge, văzând că i se opune
Este foarte important de ştiut asta!
Este interesant de ştiut dacă poliţia îl mai caută pe cel care a avut tentativa de furt.
Da , iar firmele care au mai rămas în "marea industrie" au început sa intre în regres tehnologic din cauza lipsei de investiţii